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The Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute:
Reining in The Government’s Previously
Unbridled Ability to Seize Pretrial Assets
By Kristyn Fleming Francese
Abstract
American organized crime movies are synonymous with a
climatic raid and seizure of illegal assets – typically drugs and
guns. But what is really encompassed within the Government’s
grasp; what are the “illegal assets”? The truth is that the
Government has a wide reach and the criminal seizures don’t end
when the screen goes black and the credits roll. The Federal
Criminal Forfeiture Statute, as applied to RICO and CCE cases,
typically entails the forfeiture of any asset connected to the
underlying crimes. Given that criminal forfeiture penalties have
ethical and constitutional considerations, it is not surprising to
learn that a recent United States Supreme Court decision has
scaled back the Government’s power over its ability to seize. This
Note will provide an overview of the Federal Criminal Forfeiture
Statute, as well as RICO and CCE in order to provide context,
will detail the case law history of the statute in application, will
examine the ethical and constitutional considerations, and will
question the future of the controversially applied law.
I. Introduction
Movies like American Gangster provide the general public’s
foundation for what occurs when a crime organization gets taken
down by the Federal Government. As such, Government raids
and seizure of the illegal contents within criminal facilities are
as commonplace as the injection of a mole within a crime ring.
But the reality of the Government seizures, and the forfeitures
that ensue, are not as widely understood. In the scene that
depicted the raid on notorious gangster Frank Lucas’ home in
Teaneck, New Jersey, moviegoers watched as the Drug
Enforcement Agency uncovered and seized large amounts of
634
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hidden cash stashed in the home.1 But what happened to the
large estate that Lucas left behind? The Government seized
$584,683 in cash just from the raid alone.2 Eventually, Lucas
was forced to forfeit it all – “[t]he properties in Chicago, Detroit,
Miami, North Carolina, Puerto Rico – they took everything,”
including the money held in his offshore Cayman Island
accounts.3 Lucas himself estimated his offshore wealth alone to
have been around $52 million at the time he was arrested.4
Given the authority’s unethical conduct that permeated the
takedown of the Lucas empire, there is one major question that
the general public is left with: who or what authorized the
Government to legally5 take Lucas’ illegally-gained assets?
In 1970, Congress enacted 21 U.S.C. § 8536 to provide the
Government with a statutory vehicle to seize and secure a
criminal defendant’s assets pending trial. The Federal Criminal
Forfeiture Statute applies to a laundry list of crimes that fall
generally under, or include, the Federal Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organizations and Continuing Criminal Enterprise
statutes.
The policy argument supporting the criminal
forfeiture statute is a sound one: absent a pretrial asset seizure,
a person facing criminal charges that often entail monetary
penalties would have the ability to move assets during trial so
that post-conviction, the assets are no longer in the defendant’s
possession to be seized. This, however, must be balanced against
the serious constitutional and ethical implications, namely the
1. AMERICAN GANGSTER (Universal Pictures 2007).
2. Jill Gerston, 19 Indicted in Heroin Traffic in City, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30,
1975),
https://www.nytimes.com/1975/01/30/archives/19-indicted-in-herointraffic-in-city.html.
3. RON CHEPESIUK, SUPERFLY: THE TRUE, UNTOLD STORY OF FRANK LUCAS,
AMERICAN GANGSTER (Street Certified Entertainment 2007).
4. Mark Jacobson, The Return of Superfly, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 14, 2000),
http://nymag.com/nymag/features/3649/.
5. The movie portrays many cops within the local police department as
crooked, frequently extorting Lucas for some of his ill-gotten gains. Out of the
total 70 Special Investigations Unit officers working for the NYPD at the time
of Lucas’ demise, 52 were eventually either jailed or indicted. Jake Coyle,
Original ‘Gangster’ Outshines Film, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 7, 2007, 7:41 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/07/AR200711
0701954_pf.html.
6. This statute, as the foundation of this Note, will hereinafter be
interchangeably referred to as either 21 U.S.C. § 853 or the Federal Criminal
Forfeiture Statute.
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Sixth Amendment.
Since 1970, courts have broadly interpreted the statute so
as to extend significant power to the Government. In 1989, the
United States Supreme Court was faced with the decision of
whether the statute included assets that would be used to pay
for the defendant’s attorney’s fees.7 The United States Supreme
Court in Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, held that although
the statute had no explicit exception pertaining to attorney’s
fees, the defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were
not violated.8 That same day, the United States Supreme Court
issued a near identical holding in United States v. Monsanto,
reinforcing the principle that the Government’s interest in
seizing a defendant’s assets does not violate a defendant’s right
to obtain and choose their own counsel.9
With the constitutionality of the statute initially resolved, a
circuit split developed regarding the ability for a defendant to
object to a pretrial seizure determination. The Federal Criminal
Forfeiture Statute requires probable cause that the defendant
be guilty of the crime in order to warrant a pretrial asset
seizure.10 Among many factors, one substantially determinative
factor is a grand jury’s indictment. By 2014, the circuit courts
were split over whether a defendant, who was indicted by a
grand jury, may object to, and essentially relitigate, the issue of
their probability of guilt in regard to it being the basis for asset
forfeiture. The split was reconciled in Kaley v. United States,
where the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant
is not entitled to question a grand jury’s determination, and
therefore, may not object to an asset seizure-probable cause
determination.11
With the constitutional arguments against the statute
quashed, it is important to consider other non-constitutional
issues that the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute may pose.
The Government’s broad power to seize a defendant’s assets has
many ethical implications, such as the issue of criminal
contingency fees, the ability for the Government to essentially
7. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
8. Id.
9. See generally 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
10. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(2) (2012).
11. See generally 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014).
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control a defendant’s choice of counsel, and potential pressure
during plea negotiations.
This year, however, the United States Supreme Court
curtailed the Government’s previously expansive forfeiture
power in its 2016 Luis v. United States decision. The Luis case
stands for the proposition that only assets that can be
sufficiently tied to the criminal activity of the defendant may be
subjected to pretrial seizure.12 This decision signals a significant
halt to the previously expanding power of the Government in
criminal asset forfeiture cases.
This Note analyzes the history of the Federal Criminal
Forfeiture Statute and its future, given the recent United States
Supreme Court decision, in five parts. Part II will describe the
relevant provisions of the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute
and its legislative history to provide a foundation for the
analysis. Part III will delve into the notable case law referenced
above. Part IV will discuss the ethical issues surrounding the
Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute and the Government’s
previously unbridled power. Part V will discuss the Luis case
and its effects. Finally, Part VI questions the future of the
Government’s power regarding the Federal Criminal Forfeiture
Statute given the United States Supreme Court’s denial of the
petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Nacchio v. United States – a
case that was calling for a clarification of the underlying purpose
of 21 U.S.C. § 853.13
II. History and Overview of the Criminal Forfeiture Statute
This Part will give a brief overview of the history of criminal
forfeitures and define the two pertinent criminal statutes that
will appear throughout this Note.
The United States Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute that
exists today can be traced back to Old English Rule.14 Under the
King’s rule, inanimate objects causing an accidental death were
forfeited to the crown,15 as were a person’s chattels for conviction
12. See generally Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
13. See generally 824 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137
S. Ct. 2239 (2017).
14. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974).
15. Id. at 680-81.
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of felonies and treason,16 and for violations of customs and
revenue laws.17 The English concept of criminal forfeiture18
survived the American Revolution, but existed throughout the
eighteenth, nineteenth, and most of the twentieth centuries
invisibly.
In 1970, Congress enacted the Federal Criminal Forfeiture
Statute, 21 U.S.C. § 853, to further punish those involved in
drug and organized crime by subjecting their property to
forfeiture.19 This statute opened the door to the Government’s
ability to ensure that any and all proceeds tied to the illicit
activity would not be realized upon either preliminary, or final
judgment. “Until 1970, American law did not often use the
concept of ‘criminal forfeiture.’ . . . Today, federal prosecutors
make criminal forfeiture a routine part of criminal law
enforcement in federal cases.”20 In fact, some courts have noted
that prior to the 1970 enactment of 21 U.S.C. § 853, criminal
forfeiture was prohibited.21
It is worth noting that forfeiture authorized under the
Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute is an “in personam action
against a defendant in a criminal case, and forfeiture in such a
case is imposed as a sanction against the defendant upon his
conviction.”22 This means that, as will be discussed in Parts III
and IV, a defendant’s exposure to forfeiture in terms of what can
be seized is much greater than in a civil, in rem forfeiture action.
Nonetheless, 21 U.S.C. § 853 provided a vehicle with which the
Government could seize unlawfully gained assets, so long as the
defendant had, or had likely, committed the predicate crime.

16. Id. at 682.
17. Id. at 681.
18. Criminal forfeiture, dating back to 1866, is defined as “[a]
governmental proceeding brought against a person to seize property as
punishment for the person’s criminal behavior. Criminal Forfeiture, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
19. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2012).
20. Heather J. Garretson, Federal Criminal Forfeiture: A Royal Pain in
the Assets, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 45, 45 (2008) (footnote omitted).
21. United States v. Schmalfeldt, 657 F. Supp. 385, 387 (W.D. Mich.
1987).
22. United States v. Certain Real Prop. Located at 2525 Leroy Lane, W.
Bloomfield, Mich., 910 F.2d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1990).
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The list of crimes that satisfies the predicate offense
requirement under the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute is
not a short one. There are two criminal statutes that will be
discussed in this Part, in conjunction, in order to provide a
statutory foundation for the subsequent case law analysis.
A. Organized Crime Control Act – RICO
The first is the Organized Crime Control Act, passed on
October 15, 1970,23 and Title IX, commonly referred to as the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”), in
particular. The purpose of RICO’s passage was for the
“elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and
racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in
interstate commerce.”24 Violators of RICO are subjected to a
forfeiture penalty of “any property constituting, or derived from,
any proceeds which the person obtained, directly or indirectly,
from racketeering activity . . . .”25 Specifically, RICO calls for
the forfeiture of
(1) any interest the person has acquired or
maintained in violation of section 1962
(2) any–
(A) interest in;
(B) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any
kind affording a source of influence over;
any enterprise which the person has established,
operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in
the conduct of, in violation of section 1962. has
acquired or maintained in violation of section
1962[.]26

23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2012).
24. OFF. OF THE U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-110.100 (citing
S.REP. NO. 617, 91st Cong., 76 (1969)).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (2012).
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
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Further, the word “property” itself is defined as including “(1)
real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found
in land; and (2) tangible and intangible personal property,
including rights, privileges, interests, claims, and securities.”27
If not redundant, the statute is nearly all-encompassing.
RICO is often looked at by the public as one of the United
States’ “most powerful and sweeping laws[,]” because of the law’s
ability to “stitch together crimes” and make the Government’s
job of convicting those that are undetectably involved, easier.28
The United States Department of Justice itself even
characterizes RICO as providing for “powerful criminal
penalties” that “broadly appl[y] to all criminal conduct within its
ambit regardless of whether it involves organized crime.”29
B. Continuing Criminal Enterprise – A Weighty Prong of
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act
The second statute is the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970,30 pursuant to which
Congress criminalized engagement in a Continuing Criminal
Enterprise (“CCE”). CCE is often described as the “RICO drug
statute[,]”31 and “is commonly referred to as the ‘kingpin’
statute.”32 CCE makes it a crime for anyone to commit a
predicate crime that violates a federal narcotics law, as part of a
continuing series of three or more drug offenses, in concert with
five or more persons, where the defendant acts as the organizer,
27. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963(b)(1)-(2) (2012).
28. Nathan Koppel, They Call It RICO, and It Is Sweeping, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 20, 2011, 5:14 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870
4881304576094110829882704?mod=WSJEUROPE_hpp_sections_news.
29. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RICO: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 A
MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 1, 6 (6th revised ed. 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/usam/file/870856/download (emphasis added).
30. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
31. Susan W. Brenner, RICO, CCE, and Other Complex Crimes: The
Transformation of American Criminal Law?, 2 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 239,
253 (1993) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988) as the Continuing Criminal
Enterprise statute).
32. Barbara Sicalides, Comment, RICO, CCE, and International
Extradition, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 1281, 1288 (1989).
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supervisor, or manager with respect to the persons involved, and
the defendant gains substantial income as a result.33 Violators
of CCE are subjected to imprisonment, significant fines, and
forfeiture pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853. In addition to the
forfeiture authorized under 21 U.S.C. § 853, CCE sets out a list
of seizable assets that is even more expansive. 21 U.S.C. § 881
provides:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the
United States and no property right shall exist in
them:
(1) All controlled substances which have
been manufactured, distributed, dispensed, or
acquired in violation of this subchapter.
(2) All raw materials, products and
equipment of any kind which are used, or
intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding,
processing, delivering, importing, or exporting
any controlled substance or listed chemical in
violation of this subchapter.
(3) All property which is used, or intended for
use, as a container for property. . . .
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft,
vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to
facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,
possession, or concealment of [illegal] property.
(5) All books, records, and research,
including formulas, microfilm, tapes, and data
which are used, or intended for use, in violation of
this subchapter.
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments,
securities, or other things of value furnished or
intended to be furnished by any person in
exchange for a controlled substance or listed
chemical in violation of this subchapter, all
proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all
33. 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (2012).
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moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities
used or intended to be used to facilitate any
violation of this subchapter.
(7) All real property, including any right,
title, and interest (including any leasehold
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land
and any appurtenances or improvements, which
is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or
part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of,
a violation of this subchapter.
(8) All controlled substances which have
been possessed in violation of this subchapter.
(9) All
listed
chemicals,
all
drug
manufacturing
equipment,
all
tableting
machines, all encapsulating machines, and all
gelatin capsules, which have been imported,
exported, manufactured, possessed, distributed,
dispensed, acquired, or intended to be distributed,
dispensed, acquired, imported, or exported, in
violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of
this chapter.
(10) Any drug paraphernalia . . . .
(11) Any firearm . . . used or intended to be
used to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,
possession, or concealment of property described
in paragraph (1) or (2) and any proceeds traceable
to such property.34
Both CCE and RICO are notable because they codified what
is referred to as compound liability.35 Other than the notable
difference that CCE requires that the predicate crime involve
illegal drug activity, the two criminal statues are very similar
for the purposes of this Note.

34. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (2012). Although lengthy, a full transcript of the
statute’s forfeiture power is necessary to depict just how truly allencompassing the statutes are and how the Government’s broad power to seize
appears to be backed by legislative support.
35. Brenner, supra note 31, at 241, 243 n.18.
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C. Forfeiture Under RICO and CCE
Under both criminal statutes, through the 21 U.S.C. § 853
vehicle, in order for property to be forfeited, it must be
considered “‘tainted’” – sufficiently tied to the illegal activity,
often considered “‘proceeds’” of the crime or used to “‘facilitate’ a
criminal activity.”36 Many courts use the “‘but for’ test . . .
[where] property is considered proceeds and therefore deemed
forfeitable if a ‘person would not have [the property] but for the
criminal offense.’”37
Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule
32.2, the indictment must contain the charge of forfeiture upon
judgment.38 Thus, in order for assets to be seized, a jury must
find probable cause that the defendant committed the
underlying crime. Rule 32.2, however, does not require that the
indictment identify the property which will be subject to
forfeiture.39 Upon a final judgment, or preliminary injunction,
the Government must show the requisite nexus between the
sought property and the predicate crime.40
Although enacted in 1970, initially, RICO and CCE
provisions were not as readily enforced as the two 1970 statutes
envisioned.41 In fact, allegations of RICO and CCE violations
were not commonplace in the courts until the 1980’s when the
“FBI and Department of Justice mounted a major offensive
against organized crime.”42 The legislature’s endorsement and
subsequent “expansion of criminal forfeiture . . . made it possible
for the government to seek forfeiture more aggressively and with
a greater likelihood of success[.]”43 Therefore, application of
36. Garretson, supra note 20, at 49.
37. United States v. Johnson, No. DKC 13-0294, 2014 WL 2215854, at *5
(D. Md. May 28, 2014) (citing United States v. Nicolo, 597 F. Supp. 2d 342, 346
(W.D.N.Y. 2009)) (citations omitted).
38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(a).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Referring to the Organized Crime Control Act and Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. See David J. Fried, Rationalizing
Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 328, 339 (1988).
42. David Witwer, Mobsters, Unions, and Feds: The Mafia and the
American Labor Movement by James B. Jacobs, 60 INDUS. LAB. REL. REV. 302,
303 (2007) (book review).
43. Fried, supra note 41, at 330.
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RICO and CCE gained traction and speed, and by 1986, the
Government had RICO and/or CCE cases pending against
seventeen of the nation’s twenty-four notorious crime families.44
In order to fully comprehend the severity of the forfeiture
statutes identified above, it is necessary to consider what is
subject to forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 853. As mentioned,
Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute actions apply in personam,
meaning that the judgments do not attach to the specific
property, but to the person and, therefore, any subjectable
Subjectable property includes “property
property.45
constituting, or derived from, any proceeds” obtained as a result
of the violation or any “property used, or intended to be used, . . .
to commit, or to facilitate . . . the violation.”46 “Property,” for the
purposes of this statute, is defined as real property,47 as well as
“tangible and intangible personal property, including . . .
interests, claims, and securities.”48 Additionally, access to such
an expansive list of potentially seized property is available,
absent a court finding the charged individual guilty of the crimes
with which the criminal forfeiture statutes were predicated on.
21 U.S.C. § 853(e) allows the Government to seek a preliminary
injunction or restraining order to gain control of the assets prior
to trial.49 Although the purpose is to ensure that a defendant
does not dispose of the assets in order to avoid forfeiture and to
“preserve the availability of [the] property,”50 it also indicates
the vast authority the Government has against a purported
RICO or CCE violator, which has been expanding up until the
most recent United States Supreme Court decision.

44. Koppel, supra note 28.
45. United States v. Certain Real Prop. Located at 2525 Leroy Lane, W.
Bloomfield, Mich., 910 F.2d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1990).
46. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 853(b)(1) (2012).
48. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (b)(2) (2012).
49. 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (2012).
50. Id.
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III. Case Law Review
As previously mentioned, and will be discussed in Part IV,
the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute poses numerous issues
that have the potential to infringe on a criminal defendant’s
rights. Case law decided over the last four decades, since its
enactment, addressed some of these concerns, while others still
remain unsettled.
Despite the well-founded concerns
surrounding the ethicality of the application of 21 U.S.C. § 853,
courts have continuously not only looked past these concerns,
but have interpreted the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute
broadly, which has given the Government extensive power in
application and reach.
This Part will provide a chronological analysis of United
States Supreme Court decisions that interpret the Federal
Criminal Forfeiture Statute in application through the RICO
and CCE vehicles. Since the rendering of the foundational 1989
Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, and United States v.
Monsanto cases, the United States Supreme Court has
categorically interpreted the Federal Criminal Forfeiture
Statute in a broad sense, so as to provide much power to the
Government with little restrictions.
A. Criminal Forfeiture Statute and the Right to Counsel:
Caplin & Drysdale v. United States
In Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, a man named
Reckmeyer “was charged in a multicount indictment with
running a massive drug importation and distribution scheme.
The scheme was alleged to be a continuing criminal enterprise
(CCE) in violation of . . . 21 U.S.C. § 848 . . . .”51 The District
Court granted a restraining order forbidding Reckmeyer from
transferring any of his “listed assets that were potentially
forfeitable.”52 To represent him in his pending criminal trial,
Reckmeyer retained Caplin & Drysdale (“C&D”) and paid the
firm $25,000, in violation of the restraining order.53 Reckmeyer
51. 491 U.S. 617, 619 (1989).
52. Id. at 620.
53. Id.
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later moved to modify the restraining order so as to allow him to
continue paying the firm – he needed to use some of the
restrained assets in order to, essentially, afford C&D.54 Shortly
after moving to modify the restraining order, Reckmeyer entered
into a plea deal with the Government.55
In lieu of the plea agreement the District Court considered
the motion to modify moot, considering that, pursuant to the
plea deal, Reckmeyer agreed to forfeit all of the specified
assets.56 Following the forfeiture of Reckmeyer’s assets, C&D
asserted that it had a claim to $170,000 worth of the seized
assets, along with an additional $25,000 for the pre-indictment
legal services.57 The District Court granted C&D’s claim.58 On
appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, saying that a failure to do
so violated Reckmeyer’s Sixth Amendment rights.59 The Court
of Appeals, agreeing to hear the case en banc, reversed.60
Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court heard the case
and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ en banc reversal, holding that
the assets were improperly released to C&D.61 The United
States Supreme Court held that there is no specific exception in
the statute for attorney’s fees and that this non-exception does
not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights because the
Sixth Amendment only guarantees the right to adequate
representation, and not choice of counsel using money that is not
“theirs.”62 This case set the precedent that the Federal Criminal
Forfeiture Statute, which does not provide an exception for
funds necessary to pay for an attorney, does not violate a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right when a defendant is found
guilty of the crime(s) that the forfeiture was predicated on.

54. Id. at 621.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 621
(1989).
58. See United States v. Reckmeyer, 631 F. Supp 1191, 1198 (E.D. Va.
1986).
59. United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1987).
60. See In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837
F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1988).
61. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 622
(1989).
62. Id. at 625.

13

(634-659) FRANCESE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

5/10/18 9:22 PM

2018 FEDERAL CRIMINAL FORFEITURE STATUTE

647

B. The Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute and Pretrial
Seizures: United States v. Monsanto
On the same day that the United States Supreme Court
issued the Caplin & Drysdale decision, the Court revisited the
increasingly problematic Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute in
terms of pretrial seizures.63 In United States v. Monsanto,
defendant Monsanto was indicted with running a large-scale
heroin distribution enterprise – specifically, in violation of RICO
and CCE.64 Following the indictment, a restraining order was
granted freezing the defendant’s assets.65 Monsanto then moved
to vacate the restraining order so he could use a portion of the
assets to pay for an attorney.66 The District Court initially
denied the motion to vacate.67 The Second Circuit remanded the
case for a hearing regarding Monsanto’s Sixth Amendment
argument.68 The District Court, again, denied the motion to
vacate, holding that the Government had “‘overwhelmingly
established a likelihood’” that Monsanto would ultimately be
found guilty at trial, and that the assets would be permanently
forfeited.69 The Second Circuit, this time hearing the case en
banc, modified the restraining order so as to permit Monsanto to
use the assets to pay his attorney.70
In line with the Caplin & Drysdale decision, the United
States Supreme Court reversed, reiterating the pronouncement
that a criminal statute providing for 21 U.S.C. § 853 forfeiture,
such as RICO and CCE, which contains no provisional exception
for attorney’s fees, does not interfere with a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights.71 As stated in the Caplin & Drysdale
63. Avalyn Y. Castillo, Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys Fees: The Rights
Remaining to the Accused and His Attorney After Caplin & Drysdale and U.S.
v. Monsanto, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 126 (1990).
64. 491 U.S. 600, 602 (1989).
65. Id. at 603-04.
66. Id. at 604.
67. Id.
68. United States v. Monsanto, 852 F.2d 1400, 1402 (2d Cir. 1988) (per
curiam); see also Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 604.
69. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 605 (1989).
70. See United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1991); see also
United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 604-06 (1989).
71. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 600 (1989).
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decision,
The forfeiture statute does not impermissibly
burden a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
retain counsel of his choice. A defendant has no
Sixth Amendment right to spend another person’s
money for services rendered by an attorney even
if those funds are the only way that that
defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his
choice. Such money, though in his possession, is
not rightfully his.72
C. Reconciling a Split Within the Circuits: Kaley v. United
States and Asset Forfeiture Hearings
Following the Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto cases, the
circuits began to diverge in terms of rigidity of application and
interpretation of the concept that the Federal Criminal
Forfeiture Statue does not violate a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights. Some of the circuits decided to impute
constitutional reasoning in deciding whether to grant a
defendant a hearing on the issue of probable cause in an
indictment when it led to asset forfeiture. For example, in the
Second Circuit, a defendant may, at the court’s discretion, be
entitled to a hearing reviewing the issue of probable cause,
following a grand jury indictment.73 In the Second Circuit, and
in the circuits that sit on this side of the split, a defendant must
show a genuine need to access the assets in order to retain
counsel.74
Other circuits, however, have followed the Caplin &
Drysdale and Monsanto cases strictly, holding that grand jury
indictments are final and not reviewable via hearings to redetermine the issue of probable cause when it led to an asset
forfeiture. A recent Eleventh Circuit case illustrates this side of
the split. In United States v. Kaley, the defendants were indicted

72. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 618
(1989).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Bonventre, 720 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2013).
74. Id. at 126.
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for crimes relating to a scheme to steal prescription medical
devices and resell them for profit.75 Immediately after the
indictment, the court granted an interim restraining order
freezing the defendants’ assets based on a finding of probable
cause.76 At a hearing following the indictment, the defendants
attempted to contest the grand jury’s determination that there
was probable cause that they were guilty and that their assets
would ultimately be forfeited as a result.77 The Eleventh Circuit
held that criminal defendants cannot challenge an evidentiary
basis (such as a finding of probable cause) that supports an
indictment and leads to an asset forfeiture.78 This bright line
rule contradicted Second Circuit precedent, and in order to
resolve the circuit split, the United States Supreme Court took
the Kaley case on appeal.
In Kaley v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
affirmed, ruling in accordance with the Eleventh Circuit and
against Second Circuit.79 The United States Supreme Court
proffered that the function of the grand jury is to make such
evidentiary determinations, and that a defendant is not entitled
to review or re-litigate the issues once they are determined.80
I generally agree with the proffered justification for a
refusal to review evidentiary findings based on the grand jury’s
function. I disagree, however, with the outcome that these grand
jury evidentiary determinations are not reviewable given the
substantial ethical implications they carry and the general
controversial considerations that still surround the Federal
Criminal Forfeiture Statute.
IV. The Ethical Issues of Pretrial Asset Seizures
In 1989, the Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto cases
essentially disposed of any Constitutional arguments against
criminal forfeiture statutes. Since then, especially following the
United States Supreme Court’s following of the Eleventh Circuit
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

677 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012).
See id. at 1317.
Id.
Id. at 1330.
Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1090 (2014).
Id. at 1097.
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in Kaley v. United States, courts have strictly interpreted the
statutes and applied the precedent, giving the Government
significant power over criminal defendants. But what are the
ethical issues that this line of interpretation poses? This Part
will identify the issues, both constitutional and purely ethical,
that the application of the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute
poses in order to provide a framework of thinking when
analyzing the evolution and future of relevant case law.
Although the Sixth Amendment issues surrounding the
Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute are well settled, it is worth
fleshing out the ethical considerations behind the argument.
The Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute poses a theoretical
restriction on a defendant’s choice of counsel. The Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that a
defendant in a criminal trial may “have the [a]ssistance of
[c]ounsel for his defence [sic].”81 Although the Sixth Amendment
has been interpreted not to apply to scenarios where assets are
no longer deemed to be a defendant’s,82 the ethical implication is
still worth consideration because with pretrial seizures, there is
the possibility that funds which are rightfully a defendant’s may
be wrongfully frozen, therefore unconstitutionally restricting a
defendant’s choice of counsel.
Aside from the constitutional implications, the Federal
Criminal Forfeiture Statute inherently poses several ethical
issues. First, criminal asset forfeiture may lead to criminal
contingency fees, in application. A contingency fee is payment
for services conditioned on a particular outcome, such as
favorable judgment or successful settlement out of court.83 In
the case of a criminal defendant, a contingency fee would
typically require the defendant to pay his or her attorney only if
found not guilty. Although not illegal, criminal contingency fees
have been deemed unethical.84 The American Bar Association
Model Rules of Professional Conduct specifically prohibits a

81. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 600 (1989); Caplin
& Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 617 (1989).
83. Contingent fee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
84. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(d)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N
1983); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N
1979).
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lawyer from arranging, charging, or collecting “a contingent fee
for representing a defendant in a criminal case.”85 Now consider
a situation where all of a criminal defendant’s assets are deemed
sufficiently connected to illegal activity and are forfeited to the
Government pretrial. In this situation, said defendant would
not have the funds to retain a lawyer that he or she could have
afforded had he or she been able to use those assets.
Here, there are only two options for a defendant to be
represented by counsel of their choice. First, the defendant could
be represented by a Government-provided lawyer, or another
lawyer on a pro bono basis. The other option would be for the
defendant to retain a lawyer and postpone payment until the
defendant regains access to his assets. When would that occur?
Either after a verdict of not guilty or some other type of
agreement to plea down to a lesser charge. This type of situation
would not only present ethical issues for the lawyers involved,
but there is also the possibility that such payment would lead to
a lawyer encouraging their client to take a plea deal in order to
be paid.
Further, what about the situation where certain assets are
released in consideration for agreeing to plead guilty? It is not
inconceivable to imagine a situation where a defendant facing a
lengthy RICO or CCE sentence would want to ensure his or her
family is provided for while they are gone, and in order to do so,
they might agree to plead guilty. The Government’s previously
unbridled authority to seize all assets might pressure a
defendant to plead guilty in order to secure the release of some
assets. This exact situation was seen in Caplin & Drysdale,
where Reckmeyer and the Government entered into a plea deal
whereby Reckmeyer would plead guilty in return for, inter alia,
forfeiture of only specified assets.86 This, surely, poses a
legitimate ethical issue to consider when examining the scope of
the Government’s power under the Federal Criminal Forfeiture
Statute.
Yet another potential ethical issue is this: if a RICO or CCE
defendant uses assets that are unfrozen, in consideration of a
plea deal or some other arrangement whereby the assets are
85. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5(d)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
86. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 617
(1989).
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released, to pay a lawyer, then who is technically paying the
attorney for his or her services? Under this scenario, one could
argue that the Government is technically paying the attorney,
as the assets were legally seized by the Government, and were
only paid out to the attorney because the Government
authorized the release.
Another thing to consider is the underlying legal theory that
supports the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute. Is the
purpose punitive or maybe rehabilitative or to serve as a
deterrent? Of course, on its face, asset forfeiture does not have
“any special rehabilitative or deterrent value[.]”87 Moreover,
“[i]n itself, forfeiture only requires the criminal to disgorge his
ill-gotten gains if caught and convicted, thus restoring the status
quo ante. Yet no child will be deterred from stealing cookies if
the penalty is limited to putting the cookies back in the jar.”88
Further, what about the “cookies,” or proceeds, already
expended? A defendant cannot be forced to regurgitate that
which he has already consumed. “At worst the child will be no
worse off than before the theft.”89
Then, is restitution the fundamental, underlying purpose?
But what if there are no true victims to pay back, as with a drug
dealing case tried under CCE?
Then any non-punitive
restitutive justification seems more like retribution by the
Government – a unique type of vengeance-like punishment.
Further, any argument that a dominant purpose of the Federal
Criminal Forfeiture Statute is “‘to divest the [criminal]
association of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains,’”90 must fail. As
has been readily used, the Government has the ability to seek
forfeiture of other property as a substitute asset if tracing the
“tainted” asset proves impossible.91

87. Fried, supra note 41, at 358.
88. Id. at 371-72.
89. Id. at 372. “In reality, the immediate restoration of goods converted
and consumed over time, for example, the forfeiture of substitute assets, may
be experienced as a loss more severe than the original gain. This may have an
incidental deterrent effect.” Id. at 372 n.193.
90. Fried, supra note 41, at 343 (citing United States v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 585 (1981)).
91. Garretson, supra note 20, at 52 (citing United States v. CandelariaSilva, 166 F.3d 19, 42 (1st Cir. 1999)).
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V. Reining in the Government: A Luis Case Analysis
This Part analyzes how a recent United States Supreme
Court decision, Luis v. United States, has changed the way that
21 U.S.C. § 853 is applied through RICO and CCE, by
reinforcing the nexus requirement, which had previously been
applied lackadaisically.
Since 1989, as discussed earlier, application of 21 U.S.C.
§ 853, the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute, seems to have
been expanding, giving more and more power to the Government
each time an issue pertaining to a RICO or CCE case reached
the United States Supreme Court. However, in March 2016, the
United States Supreme Court essentially halted this trend. In
Luis v. United States, defendant Luis was charged and indicted
with, among other things, paying kickbacks and conspiring to
commit fraud, totaling $45 million, most of which she had spent
by the time of her indictment.92 Following the indictment, the
District Court issued a temporary restraining order preventing
Luis from dissipating her remaining assets – $2 million – which
were unrelated to the crimes.93 Luis challenged the ability of the
Government to legally seize assets that are not sufficiently
connected to illegal activity.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that
pretrial forfeiture of assets, which are unrelated to the crimes
listed on the indictment, that are necessary to retain counsel of
choice, violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.94
Further, the United States Supreme Court held that although
the assets might, as the indictment proved, be ultimately
subjected to forfeiture absent a connection to criminal activity –
such as, upon a conviction, forfeited or seized to pay the
statutory fines – this does not overcome the fact that the $2
million in this case is untraceable to Luis’ illegal acts. Therefore,
the Government’s interest in preservation is outweighed by the
defendant’s constitutional right.
The requirement that the seized assets be sufficiently
connected to the illegal activity has existed, on the face of the
92. 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1087 (2016).
93. Id. at 1088.
94. Id. at 1089.
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statute, since its enactment in 1970.95 It appears that up until
the Luis holding, the Government was seizing certain assets
without meeting their burden of establishing a nexus between
the property and the crime. At first glance, this might seem like
a simple error in judgment because of a failure by the
Government to meet their burden and oversight as to this fact
by the lower courts. This case, however, sets the precedent that
although the Government may be given deference with regard to
discretion in identifying seizeable assets, there must be a limit.
As viewed from a macro level, this case establishes that,
although previously 21 U.S.C. § 853 has been interpreted
liberally so as to give the Government great authority and
discretion; however, liberal interpretation will not, and cannot,
override the plain language requirement of a sufficient nexus
between the property and the underlying crime.
With a RICO or CCE indictment, and subsequent jury trial,
a jury is to determine, post-conviction, if the Government met its
burden of establishing the nexus requirement.96 This results in
the jury first returning a general verdict, as to the defendant’s
guilt of the underlying crime, and then returning a special
verdict, so that “the jury hears evidence of the defendant’s guilt
for the underlying crime separately from hearing evidence about
forfeiture[.]”97 This bifurcated process is considered “fairer to
the defendant, and it prevents the jury from considering the
possibility of a large forfeiture in considering a defendant’s
guilt.”98 As seen in the Luis case, however, it is possible that the
bifurcation of the verdicts actually lowers the burden on the
Government to establish a nexus, thus making the application
of 21 U.S.C. § 853 unfair.
It is plausible to imagine a situation where a jury, after
convicting a defendant of significant criminal charges within the
purview, or culminating to the level of RICO and CCE might
seek to further punish, which is, in fact, one fundamental
95. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (mandating that, in order to seize
property, “the government [must] establish[] the requisite nexus between the
property and the offense.”).
96. Garretson, supra note 20, at 51 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(4)).
97. Id. at 52 (citing United States v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549, 558-59 (10th
Cir. 1990); HOWARD E. WILLIAMS, ASSET FORFEITURE: A LAW ENFORCEMENT
PERSPECTIVE 11 (2002)).
98. Id. at 52.
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purpose of 21 U.S.C. § 853, by having his assets forfeited to the
Government. It is further plausible to imagine that the same
jury might overlook the statutorily imposed nexus requirement
or not see it as the significant hurdle that it is, and return a
verdict that the Government has met its burden when it simply
has not, based on the facts. Without there being much more the
judicial system can do to eliminate personal biases on the jury,
the Luis holding is a rightful check on the Government’s broad
authority.
The hypothetical situation presented above poses a problem
– the solution of which is simply the lesser of two evils: Do you
leave the charges of the underlying crime and the Government’s
additional burden of establishing a nexus for forfeiture in one
trial, where the jury is able to consider the potential magnitude
of the allegedly illegal assets involved while determining overall
guilt of the predicate crime, or do you bifurcate the processes and
have the jury consider the connection between the assets and the
crime after having determined that the person is guilty of such
substantial criminal activity? The former has been formally
deemed the better option through both case law and
codification.99 This, however, does not seem like a true ‘solution’
given that the statute has underlying ethical and constitutional
concerns.
VI. The Future of The Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute
Recently, another case involving the interpretation of the
Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute was before the United
States Supreme Court. In Nacchio v. United States, defendant
Nacchio was indicted on forty-two counts of insider trading.100
Nacchio was ultimately found guilty on nineteen counts and was
subsequently sentenced to seventy-two months in prison, was
fined $19 million, and was ordered to forfeit $52,007,545.47 –
the “tainted” income he derived from the insider trading.101
Evidentiary issues eventually led to Nacchio’s sentence being
99. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2; United States v. Jenkins, 904 F.2d 549, 55859 (10th Cir. 1990).
100. 824 F.3d 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2239
(2017).
101. Id. at 1373.
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reduced to seventy months in prison and the forfeiture was
reduced to $44,632,464.38.102 The $19 million fine remained
intact.103
The main question is whether or not a forfeiture is tax
deductible. The argument for a deduction is based on the theory
that asset forfeiture, in this case, was used for restitution, rather
than punitive purposes. This theory is not without merit. The
Internal Revenue Code provides for special relief to a taxpayer
who is required to restore funds to a third party where the
taxpayer included the funds in his income in a prior taxable year
when it then “appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted
right” to the funds.104 In previous white collar crimes, some
circuits have held that restitution is “a remedial measure to
compensate another party, not a fine or similar penalty,” and is
thus deductible.105
The Federal Circuit ultimately held that Nacchio is
estopped by his criminal conviction for seeking tax relief under
§ 1341.106 Despite the fact that the prosecutor at trial advised
the court that “the Government’s intention is for . . . the
forfeiture funds[] to be used to compensate victims,”107 because
the cumulative loss of the victims was less than the total
forfeiture, the “economic reality is that Nacchio was punished
through forfeiture” and the deduction of such a fine is
disallowed.108
Nacchio subsequently petitioned the United States
Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari. The petition posed two
questions:
(1) Whether funds forfeited pursuant to a criminal
conviction are deductible in cases in which such
forfeited funds (in contrast with a simultaneously

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1374; I.R.C. § 1341 (2012).
105. Nacchio, 824 F.3d. at 1379-80 (quoting Stephens v. Comm’r of
Internal Revenue, 905 F.2d 667, 672-73 (2d Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
106. Id. at 1382.
107. Id. at 1374.
108. Id. at 1381.
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imposed punitive fine) are earmarked and used to
compensate victims of the underlying criminal
offense; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit’s holding in this case that
such forfeited funds are not deductible conflicts
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd
Circuit’s holding in Stephens v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 1st Circuit’s holding in Fresenius Medical
Care Holdings, Inc. v. United States.109
As the prosecution stated in Nacchio, the Government’s
purpose was to restore the victims. That would signal a
restitutive purpose, which would require reversal. To the
contrary, the Federal Circuit held that the Federal Criminal
Forfeiture Statute acts more as a fine or penalty, thus
identifying the primary underlying purpose as punitive. The
Nacchio petition was denied on June 12, 2017,110 meaning that
the question as to what the true purpose of the Federal Criminal
Forfeiture Statute is remains unanswered.
VII. Conclusion
Crime cinema’s portrayal of raids on a crime organization’s
facilities have proven to be as dramatic and controversial as the
real-life application of the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute.
The seizure of illegal assets you see on the screen is typically
accompanied by another seizure at a later date, this time of
illegally-obtained assets. Pursuant to the Federal Criminal
Forfeiture Statute, the Government may seize any assets of a
criminal defendant that are sufficiently related to the predicate
crime for which they are facing judgment. Further, these
seizures are not postponed until final judgment – the
Government may seek a preliminary injunction freezing certain
109. Kate Howard, Petitions of the Day, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 21, 2017,
11:23 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/02/petition-of-the-day-1097/.
110. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Nacchio v. United States, 824 F.3d
1370 (Fed. Circuit 2016) (No. 16-810) (filed on December 21, 2016). However
petition for Writ of Certiorari was subsequently denied on June 12, 2017. See
generally Nacchio v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 2239 (2017).
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assets after a finding of probable cause. This, of course, raises
significant constitutional and ethical issues. Despite its initial
slow and fruitless application, forfeitures pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 853 became synonymous with major criminal charges such as
RICO and CCE. As the Government began increasing its use of
the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute, so too did the courts
increase the Government’s power in that application. United
States Supreme Court cases such as Caplin & Drysdale v.
United States and United States v. Monsanto stood for the
powerful precedent that the Federal Criminal Forfeiture
Statute, which does not include a carved-out exception for
attorney’s fees, does not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. This includes the Government’s right to a
pretrial asset seizure, which necessarily has implications on a
defendant’s choice of counsel. These holdings strengthened, if
not broadened, the Government’s power in applying the Federal
Criminal Forfeiture Statute. Following the Caplin & Drysdale
and Monsanto holdings, a circuit split evolved regarding the
power of the Government; the question: should evidentiary
rulings that lead to the Government’s authority to seize a
defendant’s assets at trial be reviewable? The United States
Supreme Court ultimately answered that question in the
negative in Kaley v. United States. Yet again, another ruling
strengthening the Government’s power in asset forfeiture cases.
Even with the constitutionality question settled, there
remains ethical considerations that silently exist alongside
every application of the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute. It
is critical that these issues are considered when contemplating
how much power the Government should be given to seize a
defendant’s assets. Contingency fees, conflicts of interest
relating to payment, pressuring plea deals, and the
contemplation of what the true purpose is underlying the
Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute are among the many.
Given the serious ethical questions, it is no surprise that in 2016
the United States Supreme Court, in Luis v. United States,
appeared to reign in the Government’s power, by reiterating the
need for and importance of the Government’s burden of
establishing a sufficient nexus between the assets and the
underlying crimes. The future of the Government’s authority in
applying the Federal Criminal Forfeiture Statute is left to be
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seen. With the Nacchio v. United States petition for a Writ of
Certiorari denied, the question of whether the Criminal Federal
Forfeiture Statute primarily serves a restitutive or punitive
purpose remains undetermined. Clarification as to the Criminal
Federal Forfeiture Statute’s underlying purpose would have an
effect on the Government’s vast power in its ability to seize
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853, and the question continues to be
ripe for consideration.
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